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MELANCON

[L. A. No. 22883.

v.

SuPERIOR CouRT

In Bank.

[42 C.2d

Apr. 16, 1954.]

CLEMENT J. MELANCON, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent.
[1] Prohibition - Grounds - Constitutional Questions.-Where
there is no other adequate remedy, such as by appeal, the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance may be tested by
prohibition on ground that invalidity of legislation goes to
jurisdiction of court to proceed to try case.
[2] Mandamus-To Courts-Depositions: Prohibition-Adequacy
of Remedy by Appeal.-Where hearing on defendants' motions
to require plaintiff in a derivative stockholders' suit to furnish
security for reasonable expenses which they may incur in defending suit (see Corp. Code, § 834) has been held and an
order for furnishing security by plaintiff has been made prior
to consideration by Supreme Court of his petition for writ of
mandamus to compel superior court to enforce his claimed
right to take depositions of certain individual defendants and
officers of corporate defendants, and of his petition for writ
of prohibition to restrain lower court from proceeding with
hearing of defendants' motions to require him to furnish
security, the remedy by appeal from judgment of dismissal
which presumably will follow if ordered security is not furnished is an adequate and more appropriate remedy than the
writs sought.
[3] Prohibition- Acts Prohibitable- Completed Proceedings.Prohibition ordinarily issues only to prevent future judicial
acts rather than to undo acts already performed.
[ 4] !d.-Acts Prohibitable-Completed Proceedings.-No such aggravated circumstances or consequential damages would appear
to flow from an order requiring the furnishing of security by
plaintiff in a derivative stockholders' action, or from entry of
an appealable judgment of dismissal which would follow plaintiff's failure to comply with security order, as to come within
exception to rule that prohibition issues only to prevent future
judicial acts.
[1] Determination of unconstitutionality of statute in prohibition proceeding, note, 113 A.L.R. 796. See, also, Cal.Jur., Prohibition, § 4; Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 32.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Prohibition, § 3; Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 47.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Prohibition, § 15; [2] Mandamus,
§54; Prohibitiort, § 14(1); [3, 4] Prohibition,§ 6; [5] Prohibition,
§14(1); [6] Mandamus, §100; Prohibition, §58; [7, 9] Depositions, § 8; [8] Constitutional Law, § 180; [10] Constitutional Law,
§ 174; [11] Depositions, § 41; [12-17] Corporations, § 368.5.
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[5] Id-Expense of Remedy by AppeaL-The expense of an appeal
is insufficient to justify issuance of a writ of prohibition.
[6] Mandamus- Hearing: Prohibition- Hearing.-Various complaints made by plaintiff in a derivative stockholders' suit
as to rulings by trial court on evidence offered by him on hearing of defendants' motion to require him to furnish security,
such as that one defendant subpoenaed by plaintiff as a witness was excused from testifying at such hearing because of
illness, that another defendant was allowed more security than
he requested, and that, although one continuance of such
hearing was granted plaintiff to permit subpoena by him of
certain witnesses, he was refused a further continuance although he had been unable to serve the subpoenas, may not
properly be considered on his application for mandamus to
compel superior court to enforce his claimed right to take
depositions and for writ of prohibition restraining lower court
from proceeding with hearing on defendants' motions, but only
on an appeal and a record of the hearing.
[7] Depositions-Time When Taken.-Refusal by trial court in a
derivative stockholders' suit to order completion of depositions
sought by plaintiff prior to hearing on defendants' motions
to require him to furnish security, even if erroneous, would not
violate his rights in a constitutional or jurisdictional sense,
where he was given a full opportunity to subpoena and produce witnesses and to elicit evidence, both oral and by affidavit,
and he did so at the hearing on such motions.
[8] Constitutional Law-Due Process-Hearing.-A hearing before judgment, with full opportunity to present all the evidence and arguments which the party deems important, is
all that can be adjudged vital under guaranty of due process
of law.
[9] Depositions-Time When Taken.-Opportunity to take depositions of witnesses prior to a trial or hearing is not a requirement of due process.
[10] Constitutional Law-Due Process.-Mere erroneous construction of statutes does not constitute a denial of due process.
[11] Depositions-Proceedings to Perpetuate Testimony.-Under
perpetuation of evidence statutes (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 20832089), plaintiff on a proper showing could take depositions
of defendants prior to filing his stockholder's derivative
action, and thereby discover whether there is sufficient probability of benefit to corporation to justify bringing the action.
[12] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation
-Security for Costs.-Corp. Code, § 834, relating to security
[8] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 325; Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 637.
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on Behalf of Corporation-Security
for Costs.---f'Iaintiff is not entitlnd to proceed with the depositions he seeks in the course of preparing for eventual trial
of his stockholder's derivative action where he has not complied with order of court for posting of security for costs
and attorneys' fees pursuant to Corp. Code, § 834, since the
taking of depositions for such purpose would constitute a
step in "prosecution" of action and therefore falls within
the "stay" provisions of such code section.
[14] Id.- Stockholders- Suing on Behalf of Corporation- Security for Costs.-vVhere court has made order requiring plaintiff in his stockholder's derivative suit to furnish security
for reasonable expenses which defendants may incur in defending suit (see Corp. Code, § 834), court may properly
refuse to proceed further with respect to depositions, which
plaintiff seeks, until such time as he complies with order
respecting security, and the fact that defendants may take
such depositions in the meantime does not deprive plaintiff
of equal protection of the law.
[15] Id. - Stockholders- Suing on Behalf of Corporation- Security for Costs.-Cause of stockholder's derivative action does
not belong to plaintiff but belongs to corporation, and Corp.
Code, § 834, relating to security for costs and attorneys' fees
as condition precedent to maintenance of such action, neither
adds to nor subtracts from cause of action.
[16] Id.- Stockholders- Suing on Behalf of Corporation- Security for Costs.-Corp. Code, § 834, relating to security for
costs and attorneys' fees as condition precedent to maintenance
of such action, when applied only to actions instituted since
its enactment is wholly procedural in its effect in a state
court; it merely prescribes the condition on which a volunteer
plaintiff may maintain a suit on corporation's cause of action.
[17] Id.- Stockholders- Suing on Behalf of Corporation- Security for Costs.-If plaintiff in stockholder's derivative suit
posts security ordered by court and then proceeds with the
securing of evidence by way of depositions he may thereafter, as an incident of procedural scheme set up by Corp.
Code, § 834, apply to trial court for a decrease in amount of
security on showing that the security provided is excessive.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County to enforce petitioner's claimed right
to take depositions in connection with a derivative stockholders' suit, and proceeding in prohibition to restrain such court
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from proceeding with a hearing to require petitioner to furnish
security for expenses which defendants may incur in derivative suit. Writs denied.
Guy E. Ward and David B. Heyler, Jr., for Petitioner.
Kenneth N. Chantry and David Mellinkoff as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Petitioner.
Harold \V. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and
William E. Lamoreaux, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
O'Melveny & Myers, William W. Alsup, Philip F. Westbrook, Jr., Wright, Wright, Green & Wright, Loyd Wright,
Charles A. Loring, Loeb & Loeb, Herman F. Selvin, Allen E.
Susman and John L. Cole, for Real Parties in Interest.
SCHAUER, J.--Petitioner seeks mandate to compel the
superior court to enforce his claimed right to take the depositions of certain of the individual defendants, and officers of
corporate defendants, in connection with a derivative stockholders' suit filed by petitioner, a stockholder in and as plaintiff on behalE of, defendant corporation vV alt Disney Productions. The other defendants named are another corporation and seven individuals. Petitioner 1 also asked for a writ
of prohibition restraining the lower conrt from proceeding
with a hearing (pending when the petition was filed but
concluded before the alternative writs issued) on defendants'
motions to require petitioner to furnish security, under the
provisions of section 834 of the Corporations Code, for the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, which defendants may incur in defending the derivative stockholders'
suit. The alternative writs issued, but for reasons hereinafter
stated we have concluded that the peremptory writs should
be denied and the alternative writs discharged.
Prior to our consideration of the petition for the writs
the lower court heard the motions for security, granted them
as to all except one defendant, and on September 4, 1953,
made and signed written findings and conclusions and an
order that plaintiff furuish a total of $65,500 as security
within 30 days after service upon plaintiff of written notice
of the signing of the order, that plaintiff serve written notice
1

Sometimes hereinafter referred to as plaintiff.
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on defendants' counsel of the deposit of the security within
10 days "after plaintiff has complied with this order," and
that further prosecution of the action by plaintiff "is hereby
stayed, and said defendants need not file any pleadings
herein'' until 30 days after plaintiff shall have served the
notice of his compliance with the order for security, with a
further stay until 20 days after plaintiff's sureties have justified in case defendants except to such sureties. Thereafter,
on September 10, we ordered issuance of the alternative writs;
at that time we had not been informed of the hearing held
and order made by the lower court. The writs issued commanding respondent court to show cause why the depositions
should not be ordered and prohibiting "any further proceedings with reference to a hearing on said Motions to require
security, except as directed hereby, until the further order
of this Court thereon." Thereafter, on September 16, petitioner filed a supplemental petition for the two writs, alleging
the hearing in the lower court on the security motions and
the written order of September 4 granting them, and asking
that such order be set aside and petitioner ''be permitted
to take the depositions of all party defendants," or, alternatively, that that court be restrained from dismissing the action
if plaintiff fails to furnish the security ordered.
From the petition (as supplemented) for the writs and
the return and answer thereto it appears that since 1947
plaintiff has been a shareholder of Walt Disney Productions, 2
a corporation. He filed his derivative action against that
corporation, certain of its alleged officers and directors, and
Walt Disney, Incorporated, 3 a corporation. He asked that
certain contracts between Disney Productions and defendant
Walter E. Disney, and between Disney Productions and Disney, Inc., be declared invalid; that Walter E. Disney and
Disney, Inc., account for all moneys received by virtue of
such contracts; that Walter E. Disney account for sums paid
him by Disney Productions as compensation for services rendered since 1940; and that Disney Productions and its officers
and directors be enjoined from making further payments
under the contracts attacked by plaintiff.
After filing the derivative action, plaintiff gave notices and
had served subpoenas duces tecum for the taking of depositions of certain of the defendants and corporate officers; upon
"Hereinafter sometimes referred to as Disney Productions.
"Hereinafter sometimes referred to as Disney, Inc.
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their refusals either to be sworn or to answer various questions they were directed to appear for court rulings thereon.
Meanwhile all defendants filed motions to require plaintiff
to furnish security for expenses, including attorney's fees,
under section 834 of the Corporations Code. Also, the court
stayed further proceedings on the depositions until after
the hearing and order on the motions for security. This petition (as supplemented) for mandamus and prohibition followed. As above noted, we acted on the petition without
having been informed that the lower court had theretofore
heard and granted the motions for security 4 and had stayed
further prosecution of the action until the security was
furnished. 5
In support of the order requiring such security the court
found, among other things (in the language of § 834), "That
there is no reasonable probability that the prosecution of
the cause of action alleged . . . will benefit the corporation
or its security holders.''
Petitioner in support of his contention that this case is a
proper one for the issuance of the jurisdictional writ of
prohibition, attacks, on grounds for the most part substantially the same as those recently discussed in Beyerbach v.
Juno Oil Co. (1954), ante, p. 11 [265 P.2d 1], the
constitutionality of the security provisions here involved.
[1] It is now established in this state that where there is
no other adequate remedy, such as by appeal, ''The constitutionality of a statute or ordinance may be tested by prohibi4
Except the motion of defendant Disney, Inc., which the court held
was "a third party defendant" as to which the court "has no constitu.
tional authority to grant the motion'' to require plaintiff to furnish
security. For that reason only, the motion of such defendant was denied.
In this view the court erred under our holding in Beyerbach v. Juno
Oil Co., ante, pp. 11, 23 [26:> P.2d 1], filed January 5, 1934, subsequent to the trial court's ruling herein.
5
From supplemental briefs now on file herein, it further appears that
plaintiff has not yet posted the security ordered by the court, but in·
stead, on October 2, 1953, moved the court for an extension of time
within which to furnish it. That motion "was heard on the 7th day of
October, 1953, and because of the alternative writs having been issued,"
the trial court continued the hearing on the motion until January 18,
1954. Meanwhile, plaintiff has served and filed a notice of appeal from
the order requiring the security, and defendant Disney, Inc., whose motion
for security was denied in the same order, has done likewise. The
supplemental briefs also make mention of an "intervener" whom the
trial court, ' 'after the security motions had been made,'' permitted to
appear on the plaintiff's side; defendants then moved to subject the
intervener to the security order and hearing on the motion "was postponed by the trial court."
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tion on the ground that invalidity of the legislation goes to
the jurisdiction of the court to proceed to try the case."
(Rescue Army v. Mt~nicipal Cour·t (1946), 28 Cal.2d 460,
462-467 [171 P.2d 8]; see, also, Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1102,
1103; Hunter v. Justice's Cottrt (1950), 36 Cal.2d 315, 323
[223 P.2d 465].) By our opinion in the Beyerbach case
petitioner's attacks on the statute have been answered adversely to him in most respects.
His remaining contentions concern the depositions he sought
to take. He urges that by refusing to compel completion
of the depositions the trial court deprived him of the means
of effectively obtaining evidence to oppose the motions for
security, particularly with respect to whether there is a "reasonable probability that the prosecution of the cause of action
alleged . . . will beneflt the corporation or its security holders" (Corp. Code, § 834), and that he was thereby denied
equal protection of the law. In this respect, petitioner relies
upon section 2021 of thr Code of Civil Procedure 6 and upon
cases in which mandamus has issued to compel the lower court
to enforce the right to take depositions or to perpetuate
testimony. (See JJf cClatchy Newspapers v. Sttperior Court
(1945), 26 Cal.2d 386 [159 P.2d 944]; Brown v. Superior
Court (1949), 34 Cal.2d 559 [212 P.2d 878]; Superior Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court (1951), 37 Cal.2d 749 [235 P.2d 833].)
[2] In none of the cited cases, however, had the hearing
or trial in connection with which the testimony or deposition
was sought been held and the order or judgment of the trial
court been rendered prior to the issuance of an alternative
writ or writs by the appellate court. By contrast, in the
matter now before us, as already noted, the hearing on the
motions for security had been held, over a period of three
days, and the order for the furnishing of the security by
plaintiff had been made prior to the consideration by this
court of the petition for the writs. Under such circumstances
it appears that the remedy by appeal from the judgment of
dismissal which presumably will follow if the ordered security
is not furnished is not only an adequate, but is clearly a more
appropriate remedy than the writs here sought.
[3] In the first place, the rule is that prohibition ordi"Section 2021: ''The testimony of a witness in this State may be
taken by deposition in any action at any time after the service of the
summons or the appearance of the defendant . . . . ''
'' 1. When the witness is a party to the action or proceeding or an
officer, member, agent, or employee of a corporation. . . . ''
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narily issues
acts rather thau
to undo acts
State Board
Eqttalization v. Superior Court
, 9 Cal.2d
254
P.2d
482]; 21 Cal.Jur.
and cases there cited.)
Although exceptions to this rule have been made and the writ
has been allowed where the act in
is a continuing
one and the circumstances are so
as to justify
immediate relief, such as where a receiver has been appointed,
an injunction has issued, or property has been seized under a
void order (see Evans v.
Court (1939), 14 Cal.2d
563, 580-581 [96 P.2cl 107], and cases there cited), and
"where, because of delay, there would be consequential clamages" ( GoTden State Glass Corp. v. Superior Court (1939),
13 Cal.2d 384, 389 [90 P.2cl 75]), no such aggravated circumstances or consequential damages would appear to flow from
the order requiring the furnishing of security by plaintiff
in the derivative stockholders' action, or from the entry of
an appealable judgment of dismissal which would follow
plaintiff's failure to comply with the security order. [5] As
recently reaffirmed in Jollie v. Superior Court (1951), 38 CaL
2cl 52, 56 [237 P.2d 641], the expense of an appeal is insufficient to justify issuance of the writ of prohibition.
[6] In the second place, petitioner in his third supplemental petition for the writs, complains of rulings by the
court on evidence offered by him as plaintiff at the three-day
hearing on the security motions, complains that one of the
defendants subpoenaed by plaintiff as a witness was excused
from testifying at such hearing because of illness, complains
that although one eight-day continuance of such hearing was
granted plaintiff in order to permit subpoena by him of certain witnesses he was refused a further continuance although
he had been unable to serve the subpoenas, and complains
that one defendant was allowed more security than he requested. It seems apparent from a mere statement of these
various complaints tl1at they do not go to the court's jurisdiction and may not properly be considered on this application for mandamus and for prohibition but only upon an
appeal and a record of the
[7] Finally, refusal
the court to order completion of
the depositions prior to the hearing, even if we assume (we
do not so hold) that such refusal was erroneous, would
likewise appear not to have violated petitioner's rights in a
constitutional or jurisdictional sense. He was given a full
42 C.2d-23
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opportunity to subpoena and produce witnesses, and to elicit
evidence, both oral and by affidavit, and he did so, at the
hearing on the security motions. 7 [8] As declared in Whitley v. SuperiM Court (1941), 18 Cal.2d 75, 81 [113 P.2d
449], quoting from 12 American Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, section 637, page 327, "A hearing before judgment, with full opportunity to present all the evidence and
the arguments which the party deems important, is all that
can be adjudged vital under the guaranty of due process
of law .
" (See also Wood v. Pendola ( 1934), 1 Cal.2d
435, 444 [ 35 P .2d 526] ; Dohany v. Rogers ( 1929), 281 U.S.
362, 369 [50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904] .)
[9] Petitioner cites no authority and we are aware of
none which declares opportunity to take depositions of witnesses prior to a trial or hearing to be a requirement of due
process. [10] Mere erroneous construction of statutes does
not constitute a denial of due process. (Neblett v. Carpenter
(1938), 305 U.S. 297, 302 [59 S.Ct. 170, 83 L.Ed. 182].)
[11] Moreover, as pointed out by respondent, under our
perpetuation of evidence statutes (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 20832089; see also MacLeod v. Su,perior Court (1952), 115 Cal.
App.2d 180 [251 P.2d 728]) it would seem that plaintiffpetitioner, on proper showing, could have taken the depositions of defendants prior to filing his stockholder's derivative
action, and have thereby discovered whether there was sufficient probability of benefit to the corporation to justify bringing the action at all. [12] Section 834, which provides for
the security motions, by its terms appears to apply only to
actions already commenced.
In addition, it may be noted that under the New Jersey
statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 8 (1949), 337 U.S. 541
[69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528], the right of the corporation
7
We do not have before us and we do not here consider the effect of
the security statute with respect to denial of the right to take the deposition of a non-resident witness whose testimony material to the motion is
not otherwise available.
"The ultimate question in that ease, as stated by the court (p. 543 of
337 U.S.) "is whether a federal court, having jurisdiction of a stockholders' derivative action only because the parties are of diverse citizenship, must apply a statute of the forum state which makes the plaintiff,
if unsuccessful, liable for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, of the defense and entitles the corporation to require security for
their payment.'' The act expressly provided that it should ''take effect
immediately and shall apply to all such actions [stockholders' derivative
suits by stockholders holding less than five per centum in value (or
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to require plaintiff to "give security for the reasonable expenses, including counsel fees,'' is absolute (when it arises
at all, under the terms of the act)
unlike the California
statute, does not depend upon a
of nonprobability
of benefit to the corporation from prosecution of the derivative action. Consequently it is apparent that in the invoked
constitutional aspect it is not necessary to the sustaining of
the statute now before us that such a showing be made or that
plaintiff be accorded the right he claims of taking depositions
in order to support his claim of probable benefit.
[13] Petitioner further urges that he is entitled to proceed with the depositions he seeks, in the course of preparing
for the eventual trial of the derivative action, even though
he has not as yet complied with the order for the posting of
security. It seems clear, however, that the taking of depositions for such purpose would constitute a step in the "prosecution'' of the action and therefore falls within the stay
provisions of section 834. 9 (See Ray Wong v. Earle C. Anthony, Inc. (1926), 199 Cal. 15, 18 [247 P. 894], in which
it is stated that ''The term 'prosecution' is sufficiently comprehensive to include every step in an action from its
$50,000.00 market value) of the corporation's aggregate shares] . . . now
pending . . . and to all future actions . . . ''
In relation to constitutionality, the court held that such statute appeared to be substantially prospective in application: ''Its terms do not
appear to require an interpretation that it creates new liability against
the plaintiff for expenses incurred by the defense previous to its enactment. The statute would admit. of a construction that plaintiff's liability
begins only from the time when the Act was passed or perhaps when the
corporation's application for security is granted and that security for
expenses and counsel fees which 'may be incurred' does not include those
which have been incurred before one or the other of these periods."
As to the ultimate question-whether the statute (which
emphasized
by ,Justices Douglas and Frankfurter is inherently procedural in effect)
was so narrowly and exclusiv<"ly state-court procedural in character as
to not be properly enforceable in actions maintained in federal courts
because of diversity of citizenship-the court pointed out that (pp. 5555:)6 of 337 U.S.) "Rules which lawyers call procedural do not always
exhaust their effect by regulating procedure. But this statute is not
merely a regulation of procedure. . . . [I]t creates a new liability where
none existed before, for it makes a stockholder who institutes a derivative
action liable for the expense to which he puts the corporation and other
defendants, if he does not make good his claims . . . If all the Act did
was to create this liability, it would clearly be substantive . . . We do
not think a statute which so conditions the stockholder's action can be
disregarded by the federal court as a mere procedural device."
9
Section 8:)4, subd. (c): "If any such motion [for security] is filed,
no pleadings need be filed by the corporation or any other defendant, and
the prosecution of such action shall be stayed, until 10 days after such
motion shall have been disposed of."

as
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commencement to its final determination.") [14] It therefore appears that the court has properly refused to proueed
further with respect to the depositions until such time as
petitioner may
with the order respecting security.
The fact that defendants may take such depositions in the
meantime, if
be so advised, does not deprive petitioner
of equal
of the law. As declared in the Hogan
and
the power of the Legislature in this
type of
is
and it is no more a denial of
equal protection to
petitioner's right to take depositions until he
ordered than it is to require
that he furnish such security while not
a reciprocal
requirement of defendants.
as emphasized in
both the
and
cases, the cause of action,
if any, does not belong to plaintiff. It belongs to the corporation. The statute neither adds one iota to nor subtracts
one iota from the cause of action. [16] Such statute, therefore, applied as we have applied
only to actions instituted
since its enactment, is wholly procedural in its effect in a
state court; it merely prescribes the conditions on which a
volunteer
may maintain a suit on the corporation's
cause of action. No personal right of plaintiff's is to be
litigated; if he becomes liable for the reasonable expenses of
others which he has caused them to incur in successfully
defending against his unsuccessful action for the corporation,
it is a result of his own volunteer act in subjecting himself
and the persons he names as defendants to the procedures
of the court.
[17] It may further be noted that if plaintiff does post
the security ordered by the court and then proceeds with the
securing of evidence by way of depositions he may thereafter,
as an incident of the procedural scheme set up by section
834, apply to the trial court for a decrease in the amount
of security "upon showing that the security provided . . .
is excessive."
The peremptory writs are denied and the alternative writs
discharged.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and
Spence,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
It is my considered
that a full and substantial
compliance with the laws of this state requires this court to
issue a writ of mandate compelling the superior court to
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enforce
to take certain
The
right to take
is an essential element in the process
more imof discovery and nowhere in the law is
portant than in stockholder derivative actions; since in this
type of action the
shareholder must
obtain
his facts from the records of the
or from the
corporate officers. To
the
a case is in effect a
of the
holder's derivative action.
In the case at bar, petitioner filed a shareholder's derivative
action against the corporation and certain of its officers and
directors. Thereafter the trial court issued subpoenas duces
tecum re depositions which were duly served upon Mr. Lessing and Mr. Johnson individually and upon Mr. Johnson
as secretary of the defendant corporation. Petitioner was
unable to perfect service upon Mr. Walt Disney and Mr.
to said subpoena,
Roy Disney. On July 6, 1953, and
Mr. Lessing delivered copies of certain corporate records to
petitioner and was sworn as a witness. When Mr. Lessing
he was ordered to appear
refused to answer 47 of the
in the superior court on July 13, 1953, to show cause why he
should not answer the questions propounded by counsel for
petitioner.
Meanwhile all of the defendants filed a motion, pursuant
to section 834 of the Corporations Code, to require plaintiff
to furnish security for expenses and attorney's fees. At the
time this motion was filed no depositions, except the incompleted one of Mr. Lessing, had been taken; nevertheless the
trial court stayed further proceedings on the depositions until
after the hearing and order on the motions for security. In
so doing the court committed a grave error based upon a
complete misconception of section 834 of the Corporations
Code.
Under the provisions of said section 834, the motion for
security may be supported on either of two grounds:
"(1) That there is no reasonable probability that the prosecution of the cause of action alleged in the complaint against
the moving party will benefit the corporation or its security
holders; (2) 'fhat the moving party, if other than the corporation, did not participate in the transaction complained
of in any capacity." In order to determine if either of these
two elements are present and whether the motion for security
should be granted, the trial court conducts a hearing, at
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which time, under the provisions of section 834, the court
considers ''such evidence written or oral, by witnesses or
affidavit, as may be material: (a) to the ground or grounds
upon which the motion is based, or (b) to a determination
of the probable reasonable expenses, . . . ''
It thus becomes apparent that the hearing on the motion
for security is in effect a "little trial" of the case in chief
at which the plaintiff must make his showing of merit or risk
complete defeat. In order to show that his case has merit,
it is usually necessary for the shareholder plaintiff to subpoena certain corporate records and take the depositions of
various corporate officers in advance of the hearing. Without
these essential elements in the process of discovery the shareholder may have a valid cause of action which will benefit
the corporation but he may be unable to produce the necessary
evidence at the hearing on the motion for security. No impediment should be placed in the way of a shareholder plaintiff which would prevent the securing of this necessary evidence.
When the trial court stayed further proceedings on the
depositions, until after the hearing on the motion for security,
petitioner was in effect forced into the hearing without the
necessary depositions and evidence. Such a situation could
not have been contemplated by the Legislature when it enacted section 834. It is true that section 834 provides that
after the motion for security has been filed ''no pleadings
need be filed by the corporation or any other defendant, and
the prosecution of such action shall be stayed, until 10 days
after such motion shall have been disposed of.'' But this
does not mean that the shareholder cannot continue to secure
evidence which is necessary for the hearing. Nor does it mean
that the avenues of discovery should be closed to the shareholder plaintiff. The mere fact that the plaintiff must show
the merits of his case at the hearing on the motion for security,
requires by necessary implication that he be permitted to continue his quest for the necessary evidence.
Section 2021 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
''The testimony of a witness in this State may be taken by
deposition in any action at any time after the service of the
summons or the appearance of the defendant. . . . " In
McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.2d 386,
393 [159 P.2d 944], this court stated that: "Ordinarily the
trial court has no discretion to refuse to exercise its powers
so far as necessary to secure to a litigant the right to a
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deposition in the cases defined by the code. [Citations. J The
language of 11ection 2021 of the Code of Civil Procedure
providing that 'The testimony of a witness . . . may be
taken by deposition' confers upon litigants the right to take
depositions. (See [my dissent in]
v.
Court,
16 Cal.2d 260, 264 [105 P.2d 975] .) " It is well recognized
that ''Statutes authorizing· the taking of depositions should
be liberally construed with a view to effecting their objects
and promoting justice, and to the end that a litigant in a
pending action may be affordAd a reasonable opportunity to
procure available testimony in support of his cause." (26
C.J.S., Depositions, § 4, p. 810; citing Pollak v. Superior
Cour·t, 197 Cal. 389 [240 P. 1006] ; JJ1oran v. Superior Coud,
38 Cal.App.2d 328 [100 P.2d 1096] ; and Zellerbach v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.App.2d 49 [39 P.2d 252) .)
In support of his position petitioner relies upon section
2021 of the Code of Civil Procedure and upon cases in which
mandamus has issued to compel the lower court to enforce
the right to take depositions or to perpetuate testimony.
(McClatchy Newspape1·s v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.2d
386; Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.2d 559 [212 P.2d 878];
Snperior Ins. Co. v. Supen·or Court, 37 Cal.2d 749 [235 P.2d
833] .) In an attempt to distinguish these cases, the majority
has stated in effect that in the instant case the hearing on the
motions for security has already been held and there is thus
no auequate reason why petitioner should be permitted to
proceed with the taking of depositions. 'rhe majority argues
that under such circumstances "it appears that the remedy by
appeal from the judgment of dismissal which presumably will
follow if the ordered security is not furnished is not only an
adequate, but is clearly a more appropriate remedy than the
·writs here sought.'' Such reasoning loses sight of the fact that
''Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to secure the enforcement of a litigant's statutory right to take depositions, and
an appeal from a final judgment is neither speedy nor adequate where a trial court improperly n~fused to order that
a deposition be taken." (McClatchy Newspapers v. Super1"ot·
Conrt, supra, 26 Cal.2d 386, 392.) In Brown v. Superior
Court, supra, 34 Cal.2d 559, 562, this court stated, after citing
several cases, that "Three situations are presented by the
above cases: ( 1) where a party seeks to perpetuate testimony
under section 2083 et seq., of the Code of Civil Procedure
prior to the bringing of an action; (2) where the deposition is
sought under section 2021 after commencement of the action
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and
trial; and
where the deposition is sought
under section 2021
and retrial upon a possible
reversal of the judgment. IN e see no good reason for differentiating between these three situations insofar as appealability
is concerned, or for departing from the cases which hold that
the order is not
such orders are, of
course, reviewable
from the final judgment, a
party should not he
to
to trial without the
benefits afforded
to which he is entitled, and
it is well settled that under such circumstances the burden,
expense and
involved in a trial render an appeal from
an eventual judgment an inadequate remedy."
In the instant case
desired to take certain depositions before the hearing on the motion for security was had,
but the trial court
further proceedings on the depositions until after the
and order on the motions for
security. Such arbitrary aetion on the part of the trial court
forced petitioner to appear at the hearing without the benefit
of the depositions. In its attempt to justify the trial court's
refusal to enforce petitioner's right to take depositions prior
to the hearing on security, the majority takes the position
that petitioner's rights were not violated since "He was
given a full opportunity to subpoena and produce witnesses,
and to elicit evidence, both oral and by affidavit, and he did
so, at the hearing on the security motions.'' Such fallacious
reasoning is similar to saying that where a person is given
a trial and allowed to produce witnesses it is permissible to
deny him the right to take depositions. It must be remembered that ''The statutory right to take depositions may not
be withheld or curtailed in the discretion of the court. The
cases have consistently so held. 'Insofar as the propriety of
the use of the writ for this purpose is concerned, it is well
settled that there is a clear duty on the trial court to enforce
the statutory right to a deposition and compel a witness to
testify.' (Brown v. Su,perior Court, 34 Cal.2d 559 [212 P.2d
878].)" (Carnation Co. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.2d
138, 141 [214 P.2d 552].)
The case at bar presents the unique situation wherein the
shareholder
vvas denied the
to take depositions
once the defendants had filed their motions for security.
He was thus denied certain essential rights of discovery which
have become a part of our law. Thereafter petitioner was
forced into the hearing on the motion for security without the
benefit of the desired depositions and the trial court required
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more than
in
because it found among other
things ''That there is no reasonable probability that the
prosecution of the cause of action alleged . . . will benefit the
or its
holders.'' In granting the motions
for security the trial court did, however, refuse to require
security for the "third party defendant" on the ground that
it had no constitutional authority to grant such a motion.
vVith this I am in full accord. For the reasons outlined in my
dissent in BeyeTbach v. Juno Oil Co., ante, p. 11 [265 P.2d
1], it is my considered opinion that section 834 of the
Corporations Code is unconstitutional and a denial of equal
protection of the law insofar as it requires a plaintiff shareholder to post security for third party defendants who are
neither directors, officers, nor employees of the defendant
corporation.
As part of its order requiring security the court stayed further prosecution of the action by plaintiff. The majority attempts to interpret this stay of prosecution as being sufficient
to deny petitioner the right to proceed with the taking of
depositions. In support of this position they rely on the
case of Ray Wong v. Earle C. Anthony, Inc., 199 Cal. 15,
18 [247 P. 894], in which it is stated that "The term 'prosecution' is sufficiently comprehensive to include every step in
an action from its commencement to its final determination."
The vVong case involved an action for malicious prosecution
wherein it >vas essential to the cause of action that the prosecution had begun. In such a case a comprehensive definition
of this nature may have been proper. However, it is clear
that the Legislature did not intend the word prosecution as
used in section 834 of the Corporations Code to have such an
extensive connotation. It is true that section 834, subdivision
(c), provides that "If any such motion is filed, no pleadings
need be filed by the corporation or any other defendant, and
the prosecution of such action shall be stayed, until 10 days
after such motion shall have been disposed of"; however, there
is no indication anywhere in the section that the plaintiff shareholder is to stop all activity. The mere fact that a hearing on
the motion for
required illustrates the need for
Such activity must necessarily
involve the
the preparation of affidavits,
the subpoenaing of witnesses, and the pursuit of various avenues of discovery, including the taking o£ depositions. Section
834 requires that all prosecution be stayed, but there is nothing to indicate that the word prosecution, as used, was meant
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to include every step in an action, since by its very terms,
section 834 requires a hearing following the motion for security
at which time the court ''shall consider such evidence, written
or oral, by witness or affidavit, as may be material: . . . ''
Therefore if further proceedings are required after the motion for security has been filed the term prosecution could
not have been used in such a way as to include ''every step
in an action from its commencement to its final determination.''
In view of the fact that section 834 requires the shareholder
plaintiff to produce evidence, at the hearing, which will substantiate his claim, it is not reasonable to say that the same
section also prohibits him from proceeding to take the depositions through which such required evidence can be obtained.
Such an interpretation would have the same effect as saying
that a plaintiff cannot take his depositions until after the trial
of his case. In shareholder derivative actions, the hearing
on the motion for security is actually a "little trial" of the
case and in many cases it is the deciding factor. If a shareholder is unable to secure the necessary depositions he may
be unable to secure the evidence needed to oppose the motion
for security. If the necessary evidence is not available at
the security hearing plaintiff may be required to post security
for the expenses and attorneys' fees of all the defendants.
Such expenses are frequently quite extensive, especially where
a great many directors and officers are involved as defendants.
The higher the security requirement the more insurmountable
the barrier to continuing the derivative action. In the instant case the trial court required petitioner to post more than
$65,000 in security before proceeding. How many small
shareholders are in a position to raise $65,000? How many
could raise even one half that amount? It thus becomes apparent that the outcome of the hearing on the motion for
security may be the deciding factor of the entire derivative
action.
Recognizing the crucial nature of the security requirement,
what brand of justice would prohibit the taking of depositions
preceding a hearing on the motion for security? On the
contrary, the courts of this state have consistently upheld the
right to take depositions and have frequently stated that it
would not be proper to compel a party to proceed to trial
without the depositions for which he had made proper request. In the case of McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior
Cmwt, S1{,pra, 26 Cal.2d 386, 393, this court discussed Hays
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v. Supe1·ior Court, 16 Cal.2d 260 [105 P.2d 975], and Patrick
Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.App.2d 424 [56 P.2d
1283], and then stated that although in those cases "the deferment of the time of taking the deposition was deemed justified by reason of special circumstances, there is no suggestion
in those cases that it would be proper to compel a party to
proceed to trial without a deposition for which a proper
request has been made.'' By the same reasoning it is not
proper to compel a party to proceed to a hearing, which may
be the turning point of the case, without depositions for
which a proper request had been made.
It is true that petitioner may have the amount of the
security reduced upon a proper showing that such amount is
excessive; however such a showing requires additional evidence which may not be available to petitioner unless he is
permitted to take certain depositions. In the instant case
the trial court stayed further proceedings on the depositions
both before and after the order for security had been rendered. This placed the shareholder petitioner in the unique
position of not only being prevented from taking depositions
in order to oppose the motion for security but of also being
prohibited from taking depositions which could uncover the
evidence needed to reduce the security requirement. Thus
petitioner could not secure the depositions needed to oppose
the motion for security nor could he secure the depositions
needed to show why such security should be reduced.
If this court sustains such action on the part of the trial
court, it will merely be tying another knot in the cord which
is gradually snuffing 01d the rights of corporate shareholders
to 1naintain derivative actions. For these reasons I would
grant the writ of mandate to compel the superior court to
enforce petitioner's right to take the requested depositions.

